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The War of 1812 occupies an uneasy place inthe American memory. Despite some
popular notions of victory in that conflict, serious
students of military history have always known
that the United States did not win it. The war
was at best a draw because the nation lacked
experienced officers, disciplined soldiers, a
working logistical system, and a clear-cut
strategic plan. For most of the war American
leadership was bungling and inadequate. The
performance of the Regulars was frequently far
from perfect, and that of the militia even less
so. Yet the nation maintained its territorial
integrity, and some younger Army officers
demonstrated the leadership so conspicuously
lacking at higher levels. These officers showed
that American troops, Regular or militia, when
properly led and trained performed as well as
British Regulars.
An Army in Decline Goes to War
In the years of peace after the RevolutionaryWar, the government of the United States
habitually neglected the needs of the Regular
Army, relying on geographical isolation to keep
the nation out of war and the militia to defend
its borders if war came. The military heritage of
the young republic included a small force of
Regulars, not very well supported by the federal
government and thus unable to attract the best
and the brightest, and a militia that was
unprofessional, essentially untrained, and
ineffective. Organization was simple and
unsophisticated. As constitutionally mandated,
the President was commander-in-chief. A War
Department, headed by the Secretary of War,
handled all its business with a small staff of
clerks. In 1812 the Army was commanded by
two major generals and nine brigadier generals,
one for each of the country’s nine military
districts. The generals were elderly men, who
had cut their teeth in the Revolutionary War.
From 1799 to 1812 no one was designated as
the commanding general of the Army.
In 1802 the strength of the Army was about
2,800 and never exceeded that figure as long as
Thomas Jefferson, who distrusted standing
armies, remained President. Yet during these
years the danger of war grew steadily. Great
Britain was locked in a life-or-death struggle with
Napoleon’s France. Unable to beat the French
on land, the British government blockaded
Europe, in order to starve the French Empire.
Inevitably, neutral nations suffered. The British
gave themselves the right to confiscate any
American ship and all American goods bound
for Europe. The French declared a counter-
blockade, and attempted to seize and confiscate
all ships trading with Britain.
Americans fell victim to both blockades, but
Great Britain controlled the Atlantic shipping
lanes and represented the greater danger. She
also claimed the right to board ships in
international waters to search for Royal Navy
deserters and return them to duty on her own
ships. British captains ignored the protection
given by the American flag, and removed crew
members as they pleased, including many
Americans. “Once an Englishman, always an
“The Simplest Thing is Difficult”*
The United States Army
and the War of 1812
John M. Carland
* A way of describing the U.S. Army’s response to the
demands placed on it by the War of 1812. The phrase comes
from Carl von Clausewitz’s famous pronouncement:
“Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is
difficult.”
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2Englishman” allegedly justified this
highhandedness, but Great Britain’s need was
the real justification: Only by taking alleged
British subjects from American vessels could the
Royal Navy keep its six hundred ships at sea.
Between 1803 and 1812, at least 10,000 seamen
were forcibly removed from American ships.
By 1807 both nations foresaw the possibility
of war. British agents in the American West began
to reestablish close relations with Indian tribes
angered at the way Americans had taken their
land. British actions on the frontier did not go
unnoticed in Kentucky, Tennessee, and the old
Northwest. Westerners increasingly desired – in
the event of war – not only to defeat the Indians,
led by the charismatic chief Tecumseh, but also
to invade and conquer British North America.
Taken together, British actions on the high
seas and on the frontier directly attacked
American sovereignty. The nation either could
allow Britain to do as she pleased, or go to war.
The militia Act of 1792 provided for the
enrollment of able-bodied white males between
18 and 45 years of age into organized and trained
state militias. But compliance was left to the
individual state, and there was no penalty for
non-compliance. Furthermore, the constitution
did not make clear whether the federal
government could order the militia to operate
outside the borders of its home state. Under
President James Madison the size of the Army
rose, fluctuating between 5,600 and 7,000. But
the means of fighting failed to grow as fast as
the international crisis. The nation was still
unready for a serious struggle when Madison,
on 1 June 1812, asked Congress to declare war.
Developing a Strategic Plan
Already American leaders had begun talks onstrategy. In February 1812 William Hull,
governor of the Michigan Territory and soon to
be brigadier general in the Regular Army, and
Henry Dearborn, the senior major general,
arrived in Washington. Both had served with
bravery and distinction in the Revolutionary War
more than three decades ago. They huddled with
Secretary of War William Eustis and President
James Madison. Though Madison was a
founding father and a shaper of the Constitution,
he was indecisive and uncertain about how to
prosecute military conflict. As a warlike young
Westerner, Henry Clay, declared: “Mr. Madison…
is not fit for the rough and rude blasts which
the conflicts of nations generate.”
Yet a strategic plan of sorts emerged. There
was one easy way to get at Great Britain, for the
northern states shared a border with British
North America (or Canada, as most Americans
called it). Perhaps the Army could take Canada
and hold it as a bargaining counter, until Britain
agreed to respect American rights. The goal
suggested a plan of attack. Canada was like a
tree: the St. Lawrence River was the trunk, the
various settlements west of Montreal the
branches, and Montreal the root. If Montreal was
taken, the whole string of forts to the west, on
which British power was based, would wither
away, deprived of supplies and reinforcements.
Control of the Great Lakes was also important,
for whoever controlled the lakes could move men
and material to attack and/or interdict the
enemy. America’s strategic goals, then, were to
capture Montreal and establish control of the
Great Lakes.
But almost at once the plan came apart. The
United States did not have a fleet on the lakes,
and was unwilling to spend the money to build
one. Soldiers were in almost as short supply as
shipping. Madison and his advisers had
assumed that New England militias, especially
Massachusetts’, would be available. However, the
governor of Massachusetts refused to let the
federal government use his state’s soldiers
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3because there was no insurrection to suppress
or invasion to repel, as the Constitution required.
The Regulars were too weak to act without militia
support. Instead of mounting an attack on the
enemy’s center, Madison had to be content with
attacking where his assets were strongest – in
the West, around Detroit; in the Niagara River-
Lake Ontario region; and, to the extent that
forces might become available, at Montreal. This
scaled-down version of the original plan
apparently had the virtue of being practical and
achievable. American leaders hoped that several
attacks at the same time would stretch the
military resources of the British – 4,000 to 5,000
Regulars and a few thousand militiamen – to
the breaking point.
America Takes the Offensive, 1812-14
In May Hull returned to the West and tookcommand of 1,200 Ohio volunteers. On 1 June
he began marching toward Detroit, and was soon
joined by a regiment of Regulars. On 2 July word
came that war had been declared and three days
later he reached Detroit, then a frontier
community of 800 people. Hull’s force of about
2,000 vastly outnumbered the British – a mix of
Regulars, Canadian militia, and Indian allies –
at Fort Malden, 20 miles to the south. His men
seemed impatient to engage the enemy in
combat, and his militia in particular hoped to
defeat the British quickly and get home in time
for the harvest. But on 3 August Hull heard that
American held, strategically located, and
symbolically important Fort Mackinac had fallen
to the enemy. His morale and that of his soldiers
plummeted. Increasingly and openly disgusted
with Hull, the men wanted to attack Fort Malden.
Hull momentarily gave in, ordered the attack,
but quickly countermanded his order. Then,
anxiety ridden, he retreated to Detroit.
Hull’s hesitations allowed the British
commander in Canada, Major General Isaac
Brock, to seize the initiative. A careful and
intelligent planner, and an aggressive executor
of his own plans, Brock set off for Fort Malden
with reinforcements, moving safely and quickly
by water because British naval forces controlled
Lake Erie. He quickly realized that the
Americans, though numerically superior, were
so ineptly led that a quick and vigorous attack
would take Detroit. On 15 August Brock sent
his Regulars and militia across the Detroit River,
while the Indians moved to cut off any relief force
that might appear. Then the British commander
sent a surrender ultimatum, warning that he
could not answer for the Indians’ savage behavior
if Hull refused. Brock also contrived to have a
document fall into American hands showing that
5,000 Indians, instead of the actual 600, were
on the British side. Terrified of the atrocities the
Indians might commit against American women
and children, and driven to distraction by worry,
Hull proved unable to estimate rationally his
chances of defeating the enemy. On the morning
of 16 August he surrendered, an act for which
he was later tried and convicted of cowardice
and sentenced to death (though Madison spared
him).
Without firing a shot, Brock had halted the
American offensive in the West. Unknown to
either Hull or Brock was another British victory
– Fort Dearborn (present day Chicago) had been
attacked and its defenders massacred by Indians
allied with the British on 15 August. The British
now controlled the western theater, and the
frontier was wide open to further Indian attacks.
The scene of action now shifted to the border
between New York State and Canada.
Stephen Van Rensselaer, major general of the
New York state militia, was appointed
commander of American forces in the Niagara
theater. On 1 September 1812 Van Rensselaer
reported that the effective strength of his force
was exactly 691, “many of them without shoes,
and all clamorous for pay.” Throughout
September and early October, however, his
strength grew, and by 10 October he commanded
some 6,500 men: 3,200 at Lewiston (including
900 regulars); 2,000 at Buffalo (including 1,650
regulars under Brigadier General Alexander
Smyth); and 1,300 additional Regulars at Fort
Niagara.
Brock meanwhile placed his 2,000 men,
including some Indians, in mutually supporting
positions along the Niagara River opposite the
United States. On 11 October Van Rensselaer
decided to assault Queenston, Canada. As a
diversionary action, General Smyth and his
regulars would attack British-held Fort George.
On the night of 12-13 October, a small American
force of 600, composed of both Regulars and
militia, began the crossing. Only 225 actually
landed in the right place and, as they began their
trek up the heights of Queenston, British sentries
discovered them. Shots were exchanged and the
3
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4Americans drove the British away. However,
General Smyth failed to attack Fort George,
freeing British troops to aid the defenders. Brock
rushed to Queenston with reinforcements,
where, attempting to rally the British forces, he
was fatally wounded. Now in command of the
heights, the Americans needed only
reinforcements of their own to consolidate and
expand their position.
Here was the crucial moment: if Van
Rensselaer could deliver all or most of his army
he could safely establish himself on Canadian
soil. Unfortunately, the American force was
quickly reaching its full growth and only a few
hundred more would reinforce Van Rensselaer’s
force. The troops still on the New York side were
militia men who, despite their oft-stated
impatience to engage the British in combat,
refused to join the invasion party on the grounds
that the Constitution did not require militiamen
to serve outside their home state. British
reinforcements continued to arrive, and soon the
new British commander, Major General Roger
H. Sheaffe, counterattacked with a force
consisting of Regulars, Canadian militia, and
Indians. The Indians charged first; then the
Regulars and militia fired a volley at the
Americans; after that it was cold steel all the
way. Under this relentless and powerful assault
the Americans gave way and ran. Almost all were
killed, wounded, or captured. Among those
captured was Col. Winfield Scott, who was soon
released on condition that he not further
participate in the campaign.
Command of the American war effort in the
Niagara region now passed to General Smyth.
Better at issuing paper threats than at fighting,
he was eventually forced by his own rhetoric to
take action. On 28 November an advance party
successfully crossed the Niagara River and
captured two British artillery batteries. Then
approximately 2,000 American troops climbed
into waiting boats to consolidate the beachhead,
only to have Smyth call them back. He promised
to invade Canada on 1 December, but, despite
some typical bombast (“Neither rain, snow nor
frost, will prevent the embarkation”) the result
was only another farce. By the time the American
force was ready, daylight had come, and, without
the protective cover of night, no one desired to
face the British artillery. The attack was called
off, and American operations on the Niagara
frontier came to their dismal end as winter
closed down the campaigning season.
In the eastern theater, meanwhile, Major
General Henry Dearborn, commander of the
military district which included both the Niagara
and eastern theaters, prepared to attack
Montreal via Lake Champlain, the traditional
path of invaders. Dearborn commanded a large
force of six to eight thousand men. Although
many of his troops were Regulars, few were
seasoned. At Plattsburg he initiated the action
by sending a small advance party of Regulars
across the border. At the same time, the British
dispatched 1,900 men from Montreal to counter
the American invasion. During the evening of 19
November the two forces clashed and a confused
fight ensued; the Americans apparently inflicted
wounds on five of their own soldiers before
retreating to the United States. Thus began –
and ended – the campaign against Montreal, for
Dearborn’s militiamen, standing on their
constitutional rights, refused to cross into
Canada. On 23 November the entire American
army pulled back. The Regulars went into winter
quarters, and the militia went home. By 1
December 1812, the Canadian front was quiet.
Some 54,000 American Regular volunteers, and
militia had taken the field against fewer than
10,000 enemy troops, and the result had been
failure for the United States all along the line.
Although some American military operations
in 1813 were more successful than those of
1812, tactical victories in the operations failed
to translate into strategic ones. In the West, the
state of Kentucky in late 1812 commissioned
William Henry Harrison a major general in the
militia, ordering him to defend the frontier,
retake Detroit, and invade Canada. On learning
of the appointment, Madison and Eustis made
Harrison a brigadier general in the United States
Army and also gave him command of the Army
of the Northwest. By the time Harrison’s force
of 6,500 was ready, winter had arrived, and the
army moved northward and waited for spring.
But the warm weather in 1813 at first brought
no action, for American leaders had at last
grasped the fact that control of Lake Erie was
essential to the recapture of Detroit. On 10
September 1813 near Put In Bay at the western
end of the lake, a newly-built American fleet
defeated the British. Now the British withdrew
from Detroit. Even more important, the victory
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5gave American forces, the American government,
and the American people a much needed
psychological lift.
Harrison’s army, reinforced by 3,000 more
Kentuckians and 1,000 mounted riflemen,
moved quickly to exploit control of the lake. The
mounted men rode overland toward Detroit
while the bulk of Harrison’s force sailed across
the lake. The fleeing British finally decided to
stand and fight on the north bank of the Thames
River, about 85 miles from Fort Malden. Here
800 British regulars and 1,000 Indians under
the mighty Tecumseh faced an American force
of approximately 3,500. The British put their
Regulars on the left wing and the Indians on the
right. The American mounted riflemen pressed
Harrison for permission to charge the enemy,
and the general exclaimed, “Damn them, charge
them.” The attack succeeded amazingly well.
Charging first against the open ranks of the
British, the Americans then moved against the
Indians. The British line collapsed; the Indians
resisted bravely until Tecumseh was killed, then
joined their allies in headlong retreat.
Victory at the Thames vindicated those who
maintained that control of the lakes was the
necessary precursor to successful military action
against Canada. Harrison’s success ended
British power in the northwest, brought some
Canadian territory under American control, and
crushed Tecumseh’s Indian Confederacy.
Harrison – a military leader younger, more
vigorous, and more professional than the relics
of the Revolution who headed up the Army at
the beginning of the war – heralded a new
generation of general officers who would emerge
from the war. Yet the Battle of the Thames,
although a tactical success, was only regionally
important and did not materially advance the
nation’s war against the British. The main
battleground still lay to the east, on the Niagara
River and around Montreal.
A new secretary of war, John Armstrong,
planned a three-pronged offensive aimed at
controlling Lake Ontario, as a preliminary to
attacking Montreal. First the Americans would
attack Kingston, at the eastern end of the lake;
then York, the capital of Upper Canada; and
finally, Fort George and Fort Erie on the Niagara
River. But the old familiar pattern of hesitation
reappeared. After consultation with the Great
Lakes fleet commander, Commodore Isaac
Chauncey, General Dearborn decided that
Kingston was too strong. Hence, on 24 April
1813 an expeditionary force of 1,600 under
Brigadier General Zebulon M. Pike departed
from Sackett’s Harbor to attack York. Upon
landing, Pike easily drove off the small British
force, seized the harbor, burnt a half-built frigate,
and destroyed enemy naval supplies. In the
midst of the operation a powder magazine
exploded, killing and wounding a number of
Americans and Canadians, General Pike among
them. Only 34 years old, he was a leader of
promise, promoted only the month before his
death. In retaliation, some of his soldiers
proceeded to loot and plunder York. The
expedition returned to the United States on 8
May after a raid that accomplished little except
to create anger throughout Canada over the
events at York.
The amphibious assault on Fort George, the
next step in the 1813 offensive, was planned and
executed by Winfield Scott, Dearborn’s chief of
““The American Soldier, 1814
by H. Charles McBarron
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6staff. On 27 May American ships transported a
force of 4,000 to the rear of the fort. Taking the
1,600 defenders by surprise, Scott forced the
British commander to abandon the position. In
consequence, other British forces at Chippewa,
Queenston, and Fort Erie were also ordered to
withdraw.
Another American success quickly followed.
A British force of 800 crossed Lake Ontario and,
in the early morning of 29 May, attacked the
American town of Sackett’s Harbor. The purpose
of the raid, like the earlier American raid on
York, was to harass the defenders and destroy
naval supplies and ships. The defending
Americans – a mixed group of Regulars and
militia – were commanded by Brigadier General
Jacob Brown of the New York State militia. As
the British approached, the militia broke and
ran, but in the heavy fighting that followed the
American Regulars threw the invaders back.
Then the militia rallied and the British, fearing
that they might be outflanked, retreated to their
ships and fled to Canada. To reward General
Brown’s spirited performance in organizing the
defense and inspiring the troops, he was made
a Regular Army brigadier general in July.
Just as the forge of battle allowed good
generals to emerge, it soon forced an
incompetent one to retire. On 24 June a party
of 600 United States soldiers moved out from
occupied Fort George to attack a British outpost
about sixteen miles away that served the enemy
as a forward base of operations. On the way, at
Beavers Dam, 400 Indians ambushed the
American column, and, after several hours of
hard fighting, the American commander
surrendered. General Dearborn characterized
this loss as “an unfortunate and unaccountable
event.” For him it was the end of the road.
Demoralized and in ill health, he asked to be
relieved (“to a place where my mind may be more
at ease”) and President Madison quickly granted
his request. But the American invasion had also
halted.
By early December the British appeared
ready to expel the Americans from the Niagara
frontier. Rather than defend Fort George, the
Americans withdrew on 10 December at the
approach of an enemy column, burning Newark
and part of Queenston as they left. British forces
quickly reoccupied Fort George and from there
attacked Fort Niagara, seizing the American
position with a brutally effective bayonet charge.
Then the British and their Indian allies
proceeded to raid, pillage, and plunder the
American side of the Niagara River.
The failures mounted as the United States
made a second attempt to take Montreal. Major
General James Wilkinson, another veteran of the
Revolution, replaced Dearborn. A brave but
untrustworthy man, he was almost universally
disliked throughout the Army. Similar to
Wilkinson, Major General Wade Hampton, who
commanded American forces in the Lake
Champlain area, had made his mark as a young
man in the Revolutionary War. Wilkinson and
Hampton detested one another and refused to
cooperate in any meaningful way. For example,
though technically subordinate to Wilkinson,
Hampton refused to receive orders except from
the War Department. In the midst of this
ridiculous situation the Secretary of War John
Armstrong arrived in mid-August to moderate
their feud, decide what to do, and create a plan
of campaign to carry out the decision. Whether
he had been successful in moderating the
generals’ feud remained an open question but
they had decided to attack Montreal and had
developed a plan.
The plan of attack demanded cooperation.
Hampton would march northwest from
Plattsburg and join Wilkinson, who would move
down the St. Lawrence from Sackett’s Harbor,
at which time they would attack Montreal
together. In anticipation Hampton marched his
force of 5,000 men to the Canadian border, then
halted to await news from Wilkinson. On 21
October Secretary Armstrong ordered Hampton
to move on Montreal. However, almost all of the
militiamen in Hampton’s command refused to
leave their state. He marched on with the few
who would follow him, and, about fourteen miles
from Montreal, was attacked by a small group
of French-Canadian militia. The battle of
Chateaugay River began as Hampton ordered
1,500 men to outflank the enemy as the rest of
his force made a frontal assault. The flanking
party promptly lost its way but the head-on
attack, charging with fixed bayonets, broke the
Canadian line. Then bugles began to sound and,
convinced that enemy reinforcements had
arrived, the Americans retreated. In fact the
bugles were merely a Canadian ruse. Hampton
held fast to his position until 28 October, neither
advancing nor retreating, before deciding to
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7return to the United States. As a result, the
Canadians could claim victory over an American
force eight times their own size.
Meanwhile, Wilkinson’s flotilla with 8,000
men departed Sackett’s Harbor on 17 October
and entered the St. Lawrence River on 5
November moving down river toward Montreal.
A British force of 800 followed from Kingston.
Understandably reluctant to have an enemy at
his rear, Wilkinson sent 2,000 men from the
flotilla to intercept the pursuers. Sleet and snow
had turned the battlefield to cold, icy mud and
the British had dug in. Many Americans, instead
of attacking, simply crouched behind trees and
fired their guns until they were out of
ammunition. After five hours of desultory
fighting, night came and the Americans withdrew
to their camp, losing the battle of Chrysler’s
Farm. On the next day Wilkinson learned that
Hampton had quit the attack on Montreal, and,
in consequence, he ordered Hampton’s arrest
but then rescinded his order. Realizing that his
army was in enemy territory and in no condition
to fight, Wilkinson retreated to the border and
went into winter quarters. Secretary Armstrong
had already returned to Washington, leaving
behind him farce and failure.
In 1814 the United States carried out its final
offensive against Canada. The vigorous and
resourceful Jacob Brown, now a major general,
replaced Wilkinson, who had been relieved in
April. From April through June Brown and
Winfield Scott, the latter promoted to brigadier
general, struggled to train, discipline, and equip
their troops. Scott worked especially hard on
his brigade (sometimes ten hours a day),
attempting to instill in them the discipline
necessary to stand up to sustained enemy fire
and to carry out complicated maneuvers under
fire. By July Scott’s force had become the largest
body of fully trained professional troops America
had fielded during the war.
Numbering about 3,500, Brown’s invasion
force, which included Scott’s brigade crossed
into Canada on 3 July. The plan was to take as
much territory as fast as possible before
seasoned British Regulars, released from duty
in Europe by Napoleon’s defeat, arrived in North
America. Fort Erie fell easily, and the British
retreated and set up a defensive line near the
Chippewa River. On the evening of 4 July the
advancing Americans camped a short distance
away. On the next afternoon, while Scott’s
brigade was turned out for evening parade, the
British suddenly attacked. With professional
precision Scott’s troops deployed immediately
for battle and counterattacked. British fire
created gaps in the American line that reserves
quickly and smartly filled. The two lines closed
to 80 paces, where they stopped and fired. Then
Scott shouted to his men that the time had come
to show if they could handle bayonets, and led
them toward the British line. The enemy broke
and fled, and the Americans, almost as surprised
as the British, came to a halt, failing to exploit
their opportunity. It had been a furious half hour
– the British commander, unused to professional
performance from American troops, exclaimed,
“These are Regulars, by God!”
Brown and his army now pursued the British
northwards, more slowly than he would have
wished because of uncertainties about supplies.
On 23 July the British, hoping to regain the
initiative, again sought out and engaged the
invaders at Lundy’s Lane, near Niagara Falls.
For more than five hours 3,000 British troops
fought 2,600 Americans around and on a small
hill bisected by the lane. At times the opposing
armies blazed away muzzle to muzzle. The
British attacked several times with the goal of
dislodging the Americans but failed. At midnight,
Brown ordered his troops to withdraw.
Casualties were about equal in this bitter
standoff, which served again to demonstrate that
well-trained American troops, militia or
Regulars, could fight like professionals.
Nevertheless, an invading army must win
decisively while the defender’s task is not to lose.
After Lundy’s Lane American forces fell back to
the recently captured Fort Erie. A British force
of 3,500 laid siege to the fort on 2 August, with
bombardment and assault but met with no
success. In turn, on 17 September, 1,600
Americans attacked the British guns and on 21
September forced the enemy to lift the siege,
leaving Fort Erie in American hands for the
moment.
The results of the offensive, however, were
meager for the United States. The attempt to gain
a foothold in Canada had been brought to a
standstill in approximately three weeks. An
American force did hold on to Fort Erie until
November, but by this time action on the Niagara
frontier had become of secondary importance.
Britain and its allies had subdued Napoleon, and
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8now Great Britain could take steps against the
United States that went beyond the holding
actions of the past two years. Full-scale British
attacks on the American homeland now
impended.
America on the Defensive, 1814-15
The end of the war in Europe meant thatBritain had no further need to impress
American sailors or interfere with American
shipping. However, the British government and
public felt no desire for peace. They expected
their battle -hardened regiments to be
instruments of revenge. The British government
developed a four-part strategy to weaken the
United States before negotiations for peace
began. America would be invaded from Canada;
its eastern seaboard raided; and the mouth of
the Mississippi River captured. Finally, the Royal
Navy would tighten its increasingly effective
blockade of the coastline, closing down ports
from Maine to Louisiana.
In late summer the British launched their
invasion of the United States along the route
from Lake Champlain and Plattsburg toward
New York City. Commanded by Sir George
Prevost, the expeditionary force, including
reserves, numbered approximately 18,000 men.
After crossing into New York State on 3
September, the invaders’ first objective was to
seize control of Lake Champlain, a strategically
important waterway, with a naval and ground
assault. The American naval commander,
Thomas Macdonough, knew that the superior
range and power of the British ships’ guns placed
his fleet at a disastrous disadvantage. To even
the odds, perhaps tilt them in his favor,
Macdonough positioned his ships inside
Plattsburg Bay, a movement which would compel
the British to sail through a narrow stretch of
water and engage the Americans at close
quarters under heavy fire.
Macdonough’s shrewd planning brought
rapid and decisive victory: In a mere two hours
and twenty minutes of battle, the American
ships, set up to deliver broadsides in rapid
succession, destroyed many of the larger British
ships and captured the rest. Meanwhile, British
land forces had attacked Plattsburg. Although
the Americans defenders fought bravely, they
were almost overwhelmingly outnumbered and
slowly lost ground to the British attackers.
However, when Prevost learned of the disaster
the fleet had suffered he became unwilling to
move his army further into enemy territory. He
called off the attack and retreated to Canada,
leaving behind great quantities of supplies.
Almost simultaneously, British forces moved
against Washington and Baltimore – the first
because it was the national capital and political
center of the country, the second because it was
the economic center of the Chesapeake Bay
region. These raids were intended to be punitive
and diversionary. The British commanders had
been ordered by their government “to destroy
and lay waste such towns and districts upon the
coast as you may find assailable.”
Up to that time, Secretary of War Armstrong
had always assured President Madison that
because Washington had no strategic value, it
would suffer no attack. However, since capital
cities always possess symbolic and substantive
significance, he was all too wrong. Madison’s
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9government, eventually galvanized to action by
the possibility of a British campaign in the
region, implemented measures for defense which
turned out to be inadequate and ill-conceived.
The president appointed an incompetent
general, William Winder, to lead the fight, and
Winder spent most of the months of July and
August riding around the countryside inspecting
terrain and troops, the latter a small number of
Virginia militia and untrained Regulars. Little
was accomplished except his own physical and
mental exhaustion.
Then, in August 1814, the British fleet no
more than 5,000 British Regulars aboard
gathered at the mouth of the Chesapeake. The
naval commander decided that his first priority
was to destroy or neutralize the small American
flotilla on the bay, and on 18 August the British
chased the defenders into the shelter of the
Patuxent River. Here the Americans scuttled their
ships and fled toward Washington. Now the
British troops, under the command of Major
General Robert Ross, advanced on the capital.
The advance threw the American government
and its soldiers into confusion and ultimately
into undisguised panic.
Soon the British approached Bladensburg,
Maryland, where units of the Maryland militia
waited. On the morning of 24 August, Winder
marched his men to Bladensburg, but failed to
establish control over the forces there.
Militiamen continued to arrive and take up
positions wherever they pleased. Some were so
poorly positioned that they could only shoot at
their comrades in arm. To add to the circus-like
atmosphere, Madison and most of his cabinet
rode out to Bladensburg to observe. Secretary
of State James Monroe led a group of mounted
scouts to the field, and rearranged some of the
Maryland troops without telling anyone. At one
point the president found himself almost inside
British lines but luckily escaped capture.
Secretary Armstrong wanted to take direct
command of the defense and replace General
Winder who by this time was for all practical
purposes paralyzed and totally incapable of
command. Confusion reigned in the American
camp.
Upon this scene, about one o’clock on the
hot and dusty afternoon, the British arrived.
American forces – militia, Regulars, and sailors
– numbered between 6,000 and 7,000; the
British had between 4,000 and 5,000 Regulars.
Their first attack overwhelmed the defenders.
The British rockets so terrified them that they
dropped their weapons and ran. Those who
performed most ably were the sailors, a tribute
to the Navy’s training and discipline. The routed
Americans fled to Washington, President
Madison leading the pack. The British followed,
arriving early in the evening to a deserted and
silent capital city – the President, his cabinet,
and most citizens had fled. The British began to
burn the city, setting ablaze a number of public
buildings, including the White House, the
Capitol, the Treasury, and the War Department.
The British commander hoped to hold
Washington for ransom, but could find no one
to negotiate with, and left on 25 August. A few
days later they sailed on to the next target –
Baltimore.
The British foray into the heart of America
was ultimately counterproductive. Most
Americans saw the burning of Washington as an
insult to the nation’s dignity and honor, a
humiliation to be avenged. And, on a policy level,
the disaster convinced Madison that as long as
Armstrong headed the War Department the
country could not wage war effectively.
Consequently, he replaced him with James
Monroe in September.
The raid on Washington gave Baltimore
additional time to prepare its defenses and
Baltimoreans additional reason to resist. Militia
Major General Samuel Smith took charge of the
defenses. Although a Revolutionary War Veteran,
he was competent, effective, aggressive, and
energetic. Soon, with the help of efficient
subordinates, he had 13-15,000 Maryland
militiamen and other Baltimoreans hard at work
erecting earthworks and fortifications, and
manning guns on the shore and on ships in the
harbor. Because Fort McHenry commanded and
defended the entrance to Baltimore harbor, it
was a special focus of effort.
As a matter of fact, Fort McHenry’s strategic
location convinced the British that they could
not approach the city directly and so the
commander sent his assault force along Patapsco
Neck, a narrow peninsula bracketed by the Back
and Patapsco Rivers. Anticipating the enemy’s
action, General Smith deployed on 11
September 3,000 troops there. The next day the
British fleet disgorged 4,000 men at North Point,
9
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the tip of the peninsula, thus initiating the land
attack. Almost at once the Americans won a
round – a marksman killed General Ross, the
British commander. The two forces made contact
at Godly Wood, and the Battle of North Point
began. In fierce fighting, the British took heavy
casualties, but gradually began to push the
Americans back.
Then, early on the morning of 13 September,
British ships attacked Fort McHenry. The
cannonade went on all day, throughout the night,
and into the following morning. But American
defenders continued to return fire, and the
British, unable to pass the fort, had to reconsider
their options. On the evening of 14 September
they concluded that it would cost more to take
Baltimore than they were willing to pay. Shortly
afterward they pulled out their army and
withdrew the fleet. Witnessing the cannonade
and Fort McHenry’s refusal to strike the flag, an
American civilian, Francis Scott Key, was
inspired to write a poem, which, put to music,
later became the American national anthem.
The successful American defense of
Baltimore pointed to a larger truth about the
war. Each belligerent was able to defend itself
against the attacks of the other, but neither
seemed strong or able enough to mount a
successful and sustained invasion of the other’s
territory. This pattern was reflected in the third
and final British land offensive – the attack on
New Orleans in late 1814 and early 1815.
The story really began with an Indian
uprising that gave American forces a new and
able commander. In August 1813 a part of the
Creek nation went on the warpath and
massacred some 400 people in what is today
Alabama. Fear and loathing of the Indians among
the settlers soon reached a fever pitch. Because
some of the Creeks had contacts with Tecumseh,
the possibility existed that Indians in the
northwest and southwest, encouraged and
abetted by the British, would form a super
confederacy and seriously undermine the
American war effort. These factors combined to
send southwestern Americans on the warpath,
too. At the heart of their effort was Major General
Andrew Jackson of the Tennessee militia. He
organized and led a force that demolished the
Creeks as a military power at the Battle of
Horseshoe Bend on 27 March 1814. Although
Jackson was a militia officer, his attitude was
that of a professional who knew that soldiers
had to be trained and disciplined. His men did
not necessarily like Jackson, but they respected
him because of his iron determination and his
success. His victory over the Creeks made him
a national hero, and compelled Madison in May
1814 to bring him into the Regular Army as
major general in charge of the military forces in
Tennessee and Louisiana, and the Mississippi
Territory.
According to the British government, the
purpose of the new offensive was to gain
command of the mouth of the Mississippi River
and so “deprive the back settlements of America
of their communication with the sea.” The
expedition was also “to occupy some important
and valuable” American possession, which could
be used as a bargaining counter at a future peace
conference. New Orleans seemed satisfactory on
both counts. Under the command of Sir Edward
Pakenham, brother-in-law to the Duke of
Wellington and an experienced soldier, the
expeditionary force of 10,000 left Jamaica on
26 November 1814. As the enemy fleet moved
through the Gulf of Mexico, the American army
on the Gulf Coast began preparations for battle.
Unsure where the enemy would land and
attack, Jackson, putting himself in the British
commander’s shoes, decided that “a real military
man” who knew the country would first take
Mobile, then rally the Indians to his side, and
finally move west to the Mississippi River aiming
for a point north of New Orleans. By controlling
the Mississippi and continuing the blockade, the
British could starve New Orleans into
submission. Out of this analysis came his
decision to split his command into three parts
to cover the most likely British approaches:
2,000 men to Baton Rouge on the upper
Mississippi; 2,200 to New Orleans under his
direct command; and the remaining 1,000 to
Mobile. Though he did not believe the British
would mount an amphibious attack on New
Orleans–the city was too easy to defend – he
nonetheless energetically organized his forces
there. By mid-December Jackson had completed
his work and he awaited news of the British.
When it came, Jackson realized that, contrary
to his expectations, they meant to attack the city.
The British fleet approached from the east,
and with considerable difficulty moved within
striking distance of New Orleans a few days
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before Christmas. A British advance party of
2,400 men worked its way through a bayou to
the banks of the Mississippi, a short distance
below the city. Meanwhile Jackson ordered his
units at Baton Rouge to join him, and accepted
an offer of 1,000 fighting men and supplies from
Jean Lafayette, a smuggler and pirate whose men
Jackson had previously described as “hellish
banditti.” By this time the locals – French-
speaking Creoles and free blacks – had also
formed units to aid the fight. And on 20
December the Tennessee volunteers arrived –
untrained, undisciplined, but enthusiastic.
On 23 December Jackson learned that the
British advance party intended to attack at any
moment. Deciding to move first, he ordered an
immediate pre-emptive night assault on enemy
positions. The British were taken by surprise;
in the darkness the battle became a series of
local fights, with British bayonets against
American knives and tomahawks. When the
British rallied and began to get the better of the
struggle, the Americans withdrew. Jackson had
administered a nasty shock and put the British
psychologically on the defensive.
As the last enemy troops arrived on the
Mississippi, Jackson withdrew about two miles
to a defensive position behind the dry and
reinforced Rodriguez Canal. On his right was
the river, on his left a cypress swamp, and in
front a plain dominated by his guns. Realizing
that the British could place artillery on the
opposite bank of the river and shell his position,
he ordered units of the Louisiana militia across
the river. On 28 December the American gunboat
Louisiana cut up a British attacking column;
on 1 January 1815 an artillery duel saw
American artillerymen destroy or damage many
of the British cannons.
Given how firmly ensconced Jackson’s
troops were, and given the skimpy results of the
engagements of 23 and 28 December and of 1
January, Pakenham decided that the only way
to force a decision was by frontal assault.
Confident of success, he planned a two-column
attack on the east bank of the Mississippi against
Jackson, and one-column attack on the west
bank against the militia. A third force would be
held in reserve. The attack would take place early
in the morning of 8 January, and would involve
9-10,000 British troops. Facing the British were
about 5,000 Americans, about 2,200 of whom
were actually on the Rodriguez Canal line.
Among the defenders were 800 Regulars, recent
recruits commanded by inexperienced officers.
Jackson concentrated the greater part of his
force to his left, by the swamp, but placed 800
men on the west side of the river as he deployed
the rest in two fallback positions, one a mile
and half north of Rodriguez Canal and the other
at the edge of the city.
Thick fog covered the ground on the morning
of 8 January as enemy troops, in solid ranks,
began marching toward the American line. Soon
a breeze lifted the fog and in glorious and almost
suicidal splendor thousands of British soldiers
appeared in bright red uniforms. At 500 yards
Jackson ordered his cannon to fire. A blood bath
ensued. There was nothing of tactics or military
skill about this action. American cannons tore
into the approaching British, killing and
wounding them by the score. As they came within
range of American muskets, Jackson stopped
the cannons’ fire so that smoke would not
obscure the aim of his soldiers. Firing in volleys,
the defenders laid down a steady and devastating
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hail of lead. The British right column was
especially hard hit and threatened to break. Its
commander, attempting to rally his men, rode
directly into the line of fire and was cut down by
American fire. Then General Pakenham was shot
and fatally wounded. Twice the right column
reformed its ranks, the living stepping over the
dead to fill gaps in the line. But American fire
wreaked too much havoc. The reserves got within
250 yards of the American line but could move
no closer. The left wing at first seemed to fare
better, for a few Redcoats actually reached a
small redoubt directly in front of the American
line, before they too were killed. Its commander,
himself wounded, ordered the 93d Highlanders,
a sister regiment, to cut across from the British
left to support the sagging right wing. In doing
so the regiment sustained 50 percent casualties.
With Pakenham dead, with the commander of
the right column dead, with the commander of
the left column badly wounded, and with over
2,100 dead, dying, and wounded British soldiers
lying on the field of battle, command fell to the
officer in charge of reserves. A mere half-hour
had produced this carnage.
The attack on the opposite bank had gone
better, but not well enough to justify continuing
the battle. The British had had enough. Their
remaining soldiers returned to the transports,
and on 18 January sailed away. Americans had
won a smashing victory against some of the best
troops in the world, losing on 13 dead, 39
wounded, and 19 missing in action.
How had they done it? General Jackson’s
thorough preparations – of men and
fortifications – had paid off handsomely. His
personal courage had steadied his men in the
face of what seemed at first to be an unbeatable
enemy. Jackson exercised an exceptionally
important and smart piece of good judgment at
battle’s end. Despite strong recommendations
that he go over to the offensive and pursue the
shattered British Army, he knew only too well
the limits of his raw and untrained force and
refused what must have been tempting. The day
might well have been lost if he had attempted to
transform his defensive force into an attacking
one. And finally, one also cannot discount the
impact on the battle’s outcome of the British
commander’s almost unbelievably foolhardy
plan to conduct a frontal assault across an open
field against a well-entrenched foe.
Ironically, when the battle took place, the war
had been officially over for three weeks. During
1814 British and American negotiators had been
at work in Ghent, Belgium, the Americans trying
to persuade the British to abandon
impressment, to stop interfering with American
shipping, and to cease fomenting unrest among
Indians on the frontier. Their efforts had
accomplished little because the British expected
to be in a much stronger negotiating position
after their mid-year offensive against the United
States. However, when news of the reverses at
Plattsburg and Baltimore arrived, Great Britain’s
government began to feel pressure to end the
war. The British people, after fighting France
almost continuously since 1793, were war-weary.
And so the negotiators reached an agreement to
end the war and signed the treaty on 24
December 1814. In the treaty, Great Britain and
the United States promised little more than to
stop fighting. Yet, in a larger sense, the United
States obtained its war aims. The cessation of
hostilities in Europe ended the British blockade
and made impressment unnecessary.
Furthermore, American victories over the
Indians during the war gave the British almost
no scope for future mischief on the frontier. The
victory at New Orleans filled the nation with
renewed pride and confidence, and in time
helped to make Andrew Jackson President of
the United States.
The Lesson of the War
Looking back, the central lesson of that warwas painful but simple: A trained,
disciplined, and well-led force – Regulars,
volunteer, or militia – fights better than a poorly
trained, undisciplined, and badly-led one. This
simple statement explains why America did so
badly so often in the War of 1812 and why the
527,000 men America put in the field over the
period of the conflict could not defeat Great
Britain’s force of less than 50,000. All too often,
the United States allowed the inept and
incompetent to lead the untrained and
inexperienced. Despite some brilliant victories,
the nation was lucky to escape from the war as
easily as it did.
12
Canadian Military History, Vol. 12 [2003], Iss. 2, Art. 3
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol12/iss2/3
